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Asbestos related conditions and the idea of damage in the law of 
delict. 
 
Dr Martin Hogg, Edinburgh Law School 
 
 
The Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee recently heard evidence in relation to the 
Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions)(Scotland) Bill, introduced by the Executive in June 
this year. The purpose of the Bill is to provide that certain conditions attributable to the 
ingestion of asbestos fibres - namely pleural plaques, pleural thickening, and asbestosis – will 
give rise to a right to damages in personal injuries claims, even where such conditions are 
asymptomatic, have not caused any present adverse effect to health, and are unlikely to cause 
any such adverse effect in the future. The legislation has been thought necessary to overturn 
the authority, persuasive if not binding in Scotland, of the decision of the House of Lords in 
the English appeal Johnston v NEI International [2007] UKHL 39, which refused claims for 
damages by a number of claimants in respect of asymptomatic pleural plaques caused by 
exposure to asbestos in the workplace, for the increased risk of future asbestos-related disease 
(such as symptomatic asbestosis or mesothelioma) attributable to such exposure, and for 
worry and anxiety (and in one case psychiatric illness) resulting from the contemplation of 
such possible future illnesses. Their Lordships, in rejecting all of the claims, overturned a 
twenty year old tradition of awarding damages for pleural plaques in England & Wales, a 
tradition which had also prevailed in Scotland.  
 
Before considering the issue of the proposed Bill in detail, it is worth prefacing that 
discussion by setting the debate surrounding it within the wider context of recent debates 
about the nature of recoverable harm in the law of delict (or tort). The decision in Johnston, 
and the response of the Scottish Parliament to it, is part of an ongoing legal and political 
debate as to when exposing others to the risk of injury ought properly to be recoverable in 
damages. That question has come before the House of Lords for consideration in a number of 
actions in recent years. In Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, their Lordships decided that 
failure by a surgeon to warn a patient of a risk attendant upon a medical procedure gave rise 
to a cause of action by the patient upon a harmful eventuation of that risk, even though it 
could not be shown that the failure to warn had been the cause of the ill effect, given that the 
patient might have chosen to have had the procedure in any event even had they been 
properly warned. The doctor had to accept all the consequences of a failure of his duty to 
warn. On the other hand, their Lordships held in Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2 that a 
negligent failure by a general practitioner properly to diagnose a malignant tumour, a failure 
which resulted in reduced life expectancy in the patient (who was still alive at the time of the 
claim), did not give rise to claim in damages, as such a claim for loss of life expectancy had to 
be tied to a presently suffered physical injury, and such an injury had been neither pled nor 
proven in the case. Finally, in both Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002] UKHL 22 
and then Barker v Corus [2006] UKHL 20 , their Lordships had to wrestle with the question 
of whether exposure of a claimant to a risk of a physical injury created successively by a 
number of defendants, followed by the occurrence of the relevant injury without a clear causal 
connection of it to any one of the defendants, should give rise to liability, the decision in 
Barker being that it should, but only for the loss of the chance of avoiding the injury which 
each defendant had contributed. The thread running through all these decisions is the idea that 
present bodily harm must be necessary before a claim can be brought: a mere risk of future 
injury is insufficient. 
 
The Scottish Parliament’s Asbestos Damages Bill is part of this ongoing debate about  
recovery for risk exposure, but, if passed it, will subvert the line adopted in the recent House 
of Lords’ decisions by creating a liability in damages for culpably exposing an individual to a 
risk of future asbestos-related illness even though he or she is not presently suffering from 
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any ill effects, at least as ‘ill effects’ has traditionally been understood. The proposed change 
to the law is a radical one. A fundamental principle of the common law of damages in 
Scotland has always been that, before a claim for damages can be brought in delict, the 
pursuer should have suffered some harm, or loss or injury. These three terms are often used 
interchangeably by the courts, and, whichever is used, the requirement stated is that the 
pursuer must be worse off in some way as a result of the commission of the delict. To avoid 
confusion, it is also worth noting that the term injury (or injuria) is also sometimes used in a 
different sense, to mean an actionable wrong, that is a wrongful act or omission which 
infringes an interest protected by law. When used in such a sense, the same fundamental 
principle of the law still applies however: harm or damage (damnum) is required before a 
wrongful infringement of a right (injuria) gives rise to a claim for damages.  
 
This fundamental principle of the law of damages makes it crucial to be able to determine 
when someone has been harmed, when they are worse off as the result of a delict. Although 
this issue remains somewhat neglected as a topic of comprehensive academic treatment, it 
seems clear from the case law that, so far as personal injury is concerned (and so leaving 
aside issues of economic or property damage), one or more of three marks or indicia of harm 
must be present before it can be said that harm has occurred: pain or suffering; physical 
impairment, illness or disease; or some alteration in external bodily appearance. So, back pain 
would count as damage; the loss of a limb, paralysis, or the contraction of a degenerative 
illness, would count as damage; and an alteration in skin pigmentation, even without any pain 
or other medical consequences, would also constitute damage (the point being that the law 
gives a value to the physical appearance we present to the world). Any of these three marks of 
harm alone is sufficient to constitute damage, although there is often a combination of more 
than one such mark in a particular case. If any of these marks of personal injury are present, 
then the additional presence of a risk of further harm in the future or the presence of anxiety 
or depression consequent upon the existing harm or the contemplation of the future possible 
harm, may add to the totality of the overall harm suffered by the pursuer, but the courts have 
consistently held that the risk of future harm or the presence of anxiety or depression do not 
of themselves, absent some existing recognised personal injury to which they may be 
attached, constitute recoverable harm (a point emphasised in both the Gregg and Johnston 
decisions). This evidently makes it crucial to establish whether actual personal injury has 
been caused in any case, for unless and until it has, no claim for damages may be made. That 
is precisely the question addressed by the Bill, with specific reference to the asymptomatic 
asbestos related conditions listed in it.  
 
Pleural plaques and pleural thickening are types of internal cellular changes which can 
occur when asbestos fibres are inhaled. The pleura is a membrane separating the lungs from 
the rib cage. When asbestos fibres are inhaled they are able to pass through the lungs and 
lodge themselves in the pleural membrane. This triggers a reaction by the human body in an 
attempt to engulf and destroy the fibres lodged in the pleura. Where fibres are not 
successfully destroyed, a cellular thickening is produced around the fibres. This cellular 
thickening is called a pleural plaque. Pleural plaques, in the vast majority of cases, cause no 
pain or other sensation (in Johnston the Court of Appeal stated they were symptomatic in less 
than 1% of cases). They are not harmful in any other way, and do not cause any other 
condition. They go undetected unless spotted by means of a chest x-ray or CT scan. The 
lodging of asbestos fibres in the pleura may also occasionally trigger the release of fluid into 
the chest cavity (a so-called benign pleural effusion), which in turn may lead to more 
extensive thickening of the pleura, referred to as diffuse pleural thickening. Such pleural 
thickening is more likely to be symptomatic, often in the form of an unpleasant respiratory 
sensation or breathlessness upon exertion. The presence of either pleural plaques or pleural 
thickening, indicating as each does a substantial build up of asbestos in the body, is an 
indicator of an increased risk of a harmful asbestos related condition, such as symptomatic 
asbestosis or mesothelioma (a terminal cancer). If such harmful conditions do arise however, 
they are caused by the presence of the asbestos, and not the pleural plaques. Persons who 
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discover that they have pleural plaques and thus that they are a greater risk of future illness 
may naturally become anxious, but such anxiety (if it is based upon a sound medical 
appreciation of the facts) is properly attributed to the risk caused by the presence of the 
asbestos, rather than to the presence of the pleural plaques. All of these facts are widely 
attested to by the medical experts, as related in the speeches of their Lordships in the Johnston 
case and in evidence before the Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament.  
 
The above description of pleural plaques and pleural thickening causes obvious problems 
for their characterisation as damage according to Scots (or English) Law. In those cases where 
symptoms occur, then there is no problem for their being described as damage. One of the 
marks of damage discussed earlier was pain or suffering. As pleural plaques may very rarely 
cause breathing difficulties (although this is more commonly so with pleural thickening), then 
in such cases the symptoms would be actionable under the existing common law, and no 
legislative change will be necessary to establish such a claim. But asymptomatic pleural 
plaques (or pleural thickening) are merely internal cellular alterations. They cause no pain or 
other sensation, they are not injurious to health, and they are not productive of any visible 
bodily alteration. In other words, as Lord Hoffmann concluded in his speech in Johnston, 
such pleural plaques are not a recognised form of damage because the claimant is no worse 
off. It is not, note, the case that asymptomatic pleural plaques are not actionable because they 
are de minimis harms, like a small scratch, more fundamentally it is because they are not 
harmful at all, a point made clearly and forcefully by Lord Scott in his speech. If symptoms 
develop, then, to be sure, so long as the symptoms are not de minimis, the plaques may 
become a type of damage, but they do not do so until one of the marks of damage is present.  
 
A proper and considered appreciation of both the fundamental principles of the concept of 
damage, and of the physiological nature of asbestos related pleural plaques and pleural 
thickening (as well as of the asymptomatic asbestosis mentioned in the Bill), leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that such conditions simply do not constitute harm or loss or injury, call it 
what you will, according to the established rules of Scots Law. Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill 
would reverse that position. Clause 1(1) states that “Asbestos-related pleural plaques are a 
personal injury which is not negligible.” This is a sweeping statement, which makes no 
distinction between whether the plaques are symptomatic or asymptomatic. As stated above, 
symptomatic plaques would already (so long as the symptoms were, as a matter of fact, not de 
minimis) constitute actionable damage. But asymptomatic plaques would not. For that type of 
plaques, the Bill simply chooses to legislate for the exact opposite effect to that produced by 
the application of the traditional rule for determining the nature of  damage in Scots Law. The 
reference to ‘non negligible’ harm is likely to have been added by the parliamentary drafter to 
address the discussion in the Johnston case of the issue of when harm becomes more than 
merely de minimis. But this fails to appreciate the point that their Lordships in Johnston 
ultimately rejected the claim for damages not because the plaques were de minimis harm, but 
because they were not harm at all. The drafting of this clause not only misses this crucial 
point, but, by treating all pleural plaques the same, fails to appreciate that if pleural plaques 
do increase in extent they may pass from being asymptomatic, to being symptomatic in a very 
minor (and thus de minimis) way, to being ultimately (in rare cases) sufficiently symptomatic 
to constitute more than merely negligible harm. 
 
 A similar effect to clause 1 is produced by clause 2 in relation to pleural thickening and 
asbestosis, with the addition that clause 2 specifically mentions that those conditions need not 
cause, or be likely to cause, any “impairment of a person’s physical condition”, thus making 
more explicit than clause 1 does the intention to establish in law that the class of recognised 
personal injuries includes asymptomatic versions of these conditions.  
 
Given the puzzling and unorthodox effect which the provisions of the Bill will produce, 
an effect which will create an isolated statutory example of non-harmful harm in Scots Law, it 
is important to ask what the Executive imagines it is doing by enacting this Bill. What 
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precisely is it for? Or, to put the matter in the way in which a public lawyer might express it, 
what is the ‘mischief’ which the Bill is intended to address? It is difficult to find one other 
than in the fact that Scottish courts (and English courts too) had been awarding damages for 
pleural plaques for some years prior to the Johnston decision. The effect of Johnston was to 
galvanise a number of groups who represent the interests of those living with asbestos-related 
conditions to lobby the Scottish Executive to undo their Lordships’ ruling, on the ground that 
such persons genuinely suffer anxiety at their physical state, and that it would be harsh to 
undo a tradition of awarding compensation for such anxiety given the cloud of possible future 
ill health under which they live. The effect which such an emotional appeal might have on 
some politicians will be appreciated. After all, it is only admittedly negligent employers or 
their insurers who will suffer by the passage of the Bill, hardly the ‘good guys’ in the public’s 
eyes, if one may express it in that crude fashion. 
 
In what seems thus to be the weak reasons lying behind this Bill, much has been made of 
the tradition of compensating for asymptomatic pleural plaques in the Scottish courts prior to 
Johnston. It is true that in two reported cases from the late 1990s damages were awarded in 
respect of pleural plaques, but neither case is satisfactory in its legal analysis. In the first case, 
Gibson v McAndrew Wormald & Co 1998 SLT 562, an employee sought damages from his 
employer in respect of negligent exposure to asbestos, his claim for damages relating to the 
development of pleural plaques, the increased risk of fatal illness which the exposure had 
caused him, and the anxiety and depression suffered by him in contemplation of the 
possibility of developing such future illness. The Lord Ordinary, without any discussion of 
the nature of damage in Scots Law, simply chose to accept the pursuer’s claim that damage 
had already been caused to his lungs by virtue of the presence of the asymptomatic plaques. 
As argued earlier, this assertion is inconsistent with the established idea of damage in the law. 
His Lordship went on to add (at p564A) that the three things for which the pursuer was 
seeking damages were “all connected, one with the other”. It is hard to see how this could 
have been the case. The presence of the pleural plaques was in no way related to the risk of 
his contracting mesothelioma in the future, neither was his anxiety related to the presence of 
the pleural plaques but rather to the risk of future illness. The connection drawn by the Lord 
Ordinary between the three heads of damage was specifically rejected by their Lordships in 
Johnston, as noted by both the Scottish judges in the case, Lord Hope (see para 50 of his 
speech) and Lord Rodger (see para 90 of his speech). Their detailed analysis of the relevant 
issues is in marked contrast to the terse and unsatisfactory treatment in Gibson.  
 
In the second of these reported Scots cases, Nicol v Scottish Power plc 1998 SLT 822, the 
exposure of the pursuer to asbestos also occurred in the workplace. The facts differed slightly, 
in that the pursuer also suffered from breathlessness, but this was determined by the court to 
be the result of his anxiety and also from his prolonged smoking, rather than from his pleural 
plaques. The analysis of the fundamental nature of the plaques is no more satisfactory than in 
Gibson, although in defence of the Lord Ordinary in this action it may be said that the 
defender had, prior to the reported proof, already admitted liability for the “loss, injury or 
damage sustained by [the pursuer] in consequence of his exposure to asbestos”. Both parties 
had thus agreed that the presence of asymptomatic pleural plaques constituted actionable 
damage, thereby precluding any proper analysis by the court of whether that was correct. This 
being a proof, we have a record of the quantum of damages awarded in respect of the plaques, 
the risk of future illness, and the pursuer’s anxiety: a sum of £13,500 was awarded by the 
court. It is hard to see how such a figure was arrived at, given the absence of any of the 
traditional marks of damage by which to judge the severity of the pleural plaques in relation 
to other types of personal injury. Interestingly, the proposed Scottish Bill is silent on how a  
judicial assessment of the quantum of damages for asymptomatic asbestos related conditions 
can sensibly be carried out.   
 
In a further case in which pleural plaques are mentioned in the judgment of the Lord 
Ordinary, Shuttleton v Duncan Stewart 1996 SLT 517 (N), albeit that the decision relates 
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largely to the question of whether a claim for symptomatic asbestosis was time-barred, his 
Lordship described pleural plaques as “not, in any general or material sense, disabling or even 
harmful”, a remark which is evidently somewhat less supportive of the view that pleural 
plaques are properly classified as injurious.   
 
These reported decisions constitute a slender and inadequate tradition for the award of 
damages for a condition which, according to the proper understanding of the nature of 
damage, is not a harm. If it is this tradition which the Scottish Executive is keen to reinstate, 
rather than the detailed, reasoned and principled judgment of the House of Lords in Johnston, 
this would indeed seem to suggest that the Bill is an emotional rather than a rational response 
to the perceived problem.  
 
Not only will the Bill, if enacted, upset the traditional understanding of damage in delict, 
it will have a number of other undesirable effects. First, it will create an  impetus to establish 
other conditions lacking any of the traditional marks of damage as actionable injuries, and 
why not? Why should asbestos alone be deserving of protection when it is productive of 
asymptomatic and harmless internal cellular change? Inhalation of a variety of substances can 
be productive of recognised physiological effects, which may or may not be symptomatic 
depending on the dosage of the substance inhaled: coal dust is productive of coalworkers’ 
pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung’ disease as it is sometimes called, silica dust of silicosis, 
bauxite dust of bauxite fibrosis, beryllium dust of berylliosis, cotton dust of byssinosis, and a 
mixture of silica and iron of silicosiderosis, among others. Under the existing law, only when 
quantities of these substances sufficient to produce symptoms of the named conditions are 
ingested will a claim for damages arise. Those who have inhaled only small quantities of the 
relevant substance, or larger quantities which have yet to produce any harmful effect, must 
wait until they suffer any ill effects. But if those inhaling asbestos are to be permitted to bring 
a claim even though they have not yet, and may never, suffer any harmful effects, why not 
concede a similar right to those who have been negligently exposed to these other dusts or 
substances? There is nothing which makes asbestos special, save that it may have a more 
vociferous lobby pressing for a right to compensation.  
 
The second unhappy effect which the passage of the Bill may create is a channelling of 
defenders’ funds away from the genuinely injured in favour of those who may be termed the 
‘worried well’. Employers’, and even insurers’, pockets are not bottomless. Opening the 
litigation floodgates to those who have merely been exposed to the risk of injury and are 
worried at this, but who are not presently suffering any ill effects, will run the risk that some 
of those suffering from demonstrably serious asbestos related conditions, such as 
symptomatic asbestosis and mesothelioma, may find themselves competing for scarce funds 
from  impoverished or underinsured employers. This would be a regrettable development, and 
is a consideration which has led other jurisdictions (some of which I mention below) from 
prohibiting claims by such ‘worried well’ litigants. 
 
The third regrettable effect of this Bill is that it will give the impression that Scotland is, 
for flimsy reasons, committing itself to a legislative position which is the exact opposite from 
that which other jurisdictions, often with a much greater experience of asbestos claims, have 
chosen to adopt. In the United States, a number of jurisdictions, including Ohio, Texas and 
Florida (which together accounted for 35% of all US asbestos claims in the period 1998-
2000), have enacted legislation specifically excluding asbestos claims by the ‘worried well’. 
Florida, for instance, passed an Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act in 2005. The 
Act begins with a ‘purpose’ provision which states that it is designed to “give priority to the 
true victims of asbestos and silica, claimants who can demonstrate actual physical impairment 
caused by exposure” (Fla. Stat. §774.202), a position it ensures in respect of asbestos claims 
by providing that a person “may not file or maintain a civil action alleging a non-malignant 
asbestos claim in the absence of a prima facie showing of physical impairment as a result of a 
medical condition to which exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor” 
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(§774.204(2)). The Scottish Bill, in making the asymptomatic conditions listed in the Bill 
actionable in damages, will legislate to achieve the exact opposite effect. It is regrettable that 
little or no thought appears to have been given to the experience of jurisdictions with such a 
long history of dealing with asbestos claims before the Scottish Bill was introduced into  
Parliament. At a time when Scotland is seeking to achieve a greater national profile on the 
world stage, such an isolated approach to asbestos liability will not only damage the 
reputation of this jurisdiction, but could act as an incentive to draw in spurious claims to our 
legal system from outside Scotland. 
 
It may be worth closing by noting that England is also considering the effect of the 
Johnston decision. The Ministry of Justice, rather than rushing in to legislative change,  
published a Consultation Paper on pleural plaques in July this year. While possible legislative 
change to undo the effect Johnston is one option being considered, the Consultation Paper 
acknowledges the dangers such change might entail, including one already discussed above, 
that “[i]nterference with the fundamental principles on which the Law Lords’ decision was 
based could have wider consequences and could be used as a precedent to argue for 
compensation in other situations” (see the Consultation Paper, para 38). The English paper  
sensibly chooses to suggest other possibilities, including a statutory compensation scheme 
like that recently established by the Compensation Act 2006 in relation to asbestos related 
mesothelioma, as well as suggesting the importance of identifying ways to “provide support 
and reassurance” to those with pleural plaques in order “to help allay their concerns”. This 
suggestion is replete with good sense. After all, on the traditional legal or medical 
understanding of the idea of damage, such people have nothing wrong with them, and may 
never have: communicating this, and so reassuring such people, is surely more sensible than 
fuelling phantom anxieties by granting a right to sue for damages, as the Scottish Bill will do. 
 
 The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the passage of the Damages 
(Asbestos-related Conditions)(Scotland) Bill would be a regrettable development. It would 
isolate the specified asbestos-related conditions from the rest of the law of personal injuries, 
turning that which is not harmful into a harm in order to reinstate a recent history of judicial 
compensation based upon scant if any discussion of whether harm has in fact occurred. It 
would harm the unity of the concept of damage in our law, and would place Scots Law out on 
a limb at a time when other jurisdictions are trying to ensure that damages for those affected 
by asbestos are channelled to those with universally recognised injuries. It would leave those 
without any harmful symptoms who have ingested one of the substances other than asbestos 
listed earlier wondering why they should not also receive compensation for their worry at the 
risk of future illness, when those who have inhaled asbestos fibres are deemed worthy of 
damages. It would fuel a compensation culture by increasing claims by the worried well, 
rather than asking, as the law presently does, such persons to wait before raising a claim until 
the time when, if ever, they suffer some genuine harm. Most of all, it will solidify an 
impression increasingly given that politicians are in too great a hurry to interfere with a 
settled and sensible common law which has demonstrated its utility, good sense and justice 
over a great many years.  
 
 
 
 
